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The excesses of the 80's-marked by the extreme overleveraging of many domestic companies' - came crashing down at
the beginning of the 90's with an explosion of debt defaults, outof-court debt restructuring and bankruptcies. 2 Even the House
of Drexel - the symbol and driving force of the avarice of the
80's - filed for protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
* The authors practice law with Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue ("Jones, Day") and
are members of the New York bar. Mr. Kirschner (Dartmouth College, A.B., 1964;
The University of Michigan, J.D., 1967) is a member ofJones, Day and the Coordinator of its New York Bankruptcy and Commercial Law Group. Mr. Kusnetz (Tulane University, B.A., 1980;J.D., 1982; New York University, LL.M., 1988) is also a
member of Jones, Day and specializes in taxation. Messrs. Solarsh (Franklin and
Marshall College, B.A., 1974; New York University, J.D., 1977) and Gatarz (Boston
College, A.B., 1984; University of Virginia, J.D., 1987) are Counsel to and an Associate with Jones, Day, respectively, specializing in bankruptcy and reorganization.
I From 1981 to 1989, the annual number of public leveraged buyouts
("LBO's") grew from 99 to 251, while the aggregate value of these transactions
grew from $3.1 billion in 1981 to more than $32.8 billion in 1989. See Cieri, Heiman, Henze, Jenks, Kirschner, Riley, Sullivan, An Introduction to Legal and Practical
Considerationsin the Restructuring of Troubled Leveraged Buyouts, 45 Bus. LAW 333 (Nov.
1989). An LBO is the acquisition of a target corporation financed by an investor
group incurring significant amounts of debt, generally secured solely by the assets
and earnings of the target company. See 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 918 (1991) (seminar discussion of LBO's). Very often, the wholesale replacement of equity capital
with debt appeared to be feasible by virtue of the savings in income taxes generated
by interest deductions rather than non-deductible dividends. While many LBO
transactions were accomplished based on earnings projections that showed that
debt service payments could be supported, in part, by utilizing the cash flow that
had previously been used to pay taxes, income taxes are in fact only payable in the
event the company has positive taxable income. Debt service, on the other hand, is
payable (or will at least be accrued currently) in all events without regard to the
company's earnings. Accordingly, the cash flow assumptions underlying numerous
LBO transactions were especially sensitive to economic downturns which depressed corporate earnings. See Cieri, supra note 1, at 368 (summary of tax issues
arising in connection with the restructuring of LBO's).
2 Thompson, Cleaning Up Mike's Mess, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., October 15,
1990, at 85, col. 1; Stein, Memo toJudge 1ood, BARRON'S, September 24, 1990, at 16,
col. 1; Hammer, Fall of the Marionettes, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1990, at 38, col. 1. Recently failed or troubled LBO's include Revco D.S., Inc., Resorts International,
Inc., Hillsborough Holdings Corporation, Federated Department Stores Inc. and
Allied Stores Corporation.
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4
Code 3 (the Code) on February 13, 1990.

The methodology available to deal with the ramifications of
overleveraging has been restricted by a recent controversial
court decision, In re Chateaugay Corp.,' and hastily passed tax legislation,6 which will lead to a further dramatic increase in bankruptcy filings, rather than consensual out-of-court restructurings,
or "workouts," 7 as the favored remedy to deal with the failed
LBO's of the 80's. This article explores the ramifications of the
Chateaugay decision and the interplay of United States tax policy
with that decision in a "workout" situation. Absent reversal of
Chateaugay and a prompt rescission of the recent tax legislation,
the authors conclude that debt-laden companies will find that a
"pre-packaged" bankruptcy under section 1126 of the Code is a
more expeditious and substantially less costly procedure within
which to attempt to restructure.8
I. BACKGROUND

The consensual out-of-court workout (or restructuring) has
long been an efficient and cost-effective alternative to bank3 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
4 In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., No. 90 B 10421 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990). Numerous Drexel subsidiaries thereafter also filed chapter 11 cases. Two
United States governmental agencies have accused Drexel of causing the demise of
many savings and loan associations. See Consolidated Proofs of Claim of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and of the Resolution Trust Company, filed in
the Drexel cases on November 15, 1990.
5 109 Bankr. 51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeals docketed, Nos. 90 Civ. 29742978, 90 Civ. 2989, 90 Civ. 2990, 90 Civ. 2993 and 90 Civ. 2994 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Chateaugay was decided by Burton R. Lifland, the Chief Bankruptcy Judge of the
Southern District of New York, on January 11, 1990. A notice of appeal was filed
on April 9, 1990. Briefs in opposition to the decision have been filed by, inter alia,
Valley Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co., Team Bank and
Maryland National Bank.
6 OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1990 Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 11325(a) (November 5, 1990) [hereinafter, "OMNIBUS ACT"].
7 The term "workout" has been defined as a "process rather than an event or
technique," resulting in a realigned financial structure. Rome, Business Workouts
Manual,
1.01, at p. 2 (1985). See also Lurey, Participation in a Pre-Bankruptcy
Workout, 427 COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 307, 311
(1987) (workout defined as a "borrower's efforts to negotiate with its lenders for a
restructuring of its debts outside of bankruptcy or other court proceedings").
8 A "pre-packaged" plan describes the procedure of devising a plan of reorganization and soliciting acceptances to such a plan prior to the commencement of a
bankruptcy case. See Aaron, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 12.09; Kaplan,
PrepackagedPlan: Popular,Limited Tool, THE BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIST, Vol. VIII, No.
1, 1 (Nov. 1990) (Part I) and Vol. VIII, No. 2, 5 (Dec. 1990) (Part II); Gross, Hahn
and al-Hibri, Restructuring Public Debt Outside Chapter 11, 465 COMMERCIAL LAW AND
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 567, 597-99 (1988).
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ruptcy. 9 Moreover, bankruptcy policy encourages the negotiated
resolution of disputes.' ° Workouts are usually commenced when
a company is unable to pay its debts and approaches creditors
seeking longer terms, deferrals, moratoriums, waivers or reductions of interest in an effort to avoid the ramifications of default.
For traditional private institutional debt, the workout is commonly negotiated between an agent or small group of lenders
and the borrower. Private workouts can take many forms, including granting new collateral, or additional collateral to the lenders
and requirements for the advance of additional funds, as well as
longer terms and a revised interest structure.'"
For publicly traded debt, on the other hand, such workouts
have most commonly taken the form of consensual exchange offers. In an exchange offer, creditors swap existing debt instruments for substitute debt instruments; the restructured (or
substitute) debt typically contains different interest or coupon
2
rates, maturity dates, security and/or financial covenants.'
Typically, one of two strategies is adopted in exchange offers
for public debt. The first is an attempt to capture the market
9 The typical complex bankruptcy lasts several years. It is a process often
fraught with uncertainty and subject to substantial transaction costs, such as professional fees and expenses, which are paid for by the debtor but which ultimately
serve to reduce distributions to creditors. Moreover, a bankruptcy may create a
stigma which a company will find impossible to overcome even if a reorganization is
successfully completed. Finally, for management-owned companies the risk that a
court-appointed trustee may replace management during the chapter 11 case often
makes the spectre of bankruptcy anathema.
10 The legislative history to the Code provides:
Most business arrangements, that is, extensions or compositions (reduction) of debts, occur out-of-court. The out-of-court procedure,
sometimes known as a common law composition, is quick and inexpensive. However, it requires near universal agreement of the business's creditors, and is limited in the relief it can provide for an
overextended business. When an out-of-court arrangement is inadequate to rehabilitate a business, the bankruptcy laws provide an alternative. An arrangement or reorganization accomplished under the
Bankruptcy Act binds nonconsenting creditors, and permits more
substantial restructuring of a debtor's finances than does an out-ofcourt work-out.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6179, 6180 (footnotes omitted). See also In re Colonial
Ford, Inc., 24 Bankr. 1014, 1017 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (finding that "the Code
encourages workouts outside, or concluded inside, chapter 11. Encouragement on
both fronts is necessary because dissent from a workout may assume a variety of
shapes.").
II See Rome, supra note 7, at 8-14.
12 See Weingarten, Consensual Non-Bankruptcy Restructuring of Public Debt Securities,
SECURITIES & COMMODITIES REGULATION, Vol. 23, No. 16, 161-63 (Sept. 19, 1990).
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"discount" that debentures may be trading at in the marketplace
by offering to exchange an existing debt instrument for a new
debenture with a reduced principal amount - the "fair market
value exchange." The second is an attempt to extend and/or
modify payment terms of existing debentures, but not reduce
their principal amount, in order to allow the troubled company
more time to recover from its financial problems-the "face
value exchange."'1 3 In either case, the exchange offer will only be
successful if a sufficient percentage of bondholders voluntarily
agree to exchange the old securities for the new ones; there is
generally no procedure to bind the dissenters (or holdouts) who
refuse to agree.' 4 Thus, even after a successful voluntary exchange offer, a number of the old or unexchanged bonds may
15
remain outstanding in the hands of the public.
The practical effect of these different kinds of exchange offers on the company is significant. By offering its creditors a fair
market value exchange, a company is able to reduce its overall
debt obligations. 16 In an environment where general market
prices of the bonds of LBO companies are very depressed, these
companies would have a great incentive to consummate such an
exchange. The fair market value exchange would also be appropriate where, in reality, the company simply cannot afford to repay its LBO debt under any foreseeable circumstances.
Bondholders, on the other hand, would resist a fair market value
I3 See Weingarten, supra note 12, at 166. Recent exchange offers include Freuhauf
Corporation and Kane Industries, each an exchange wherein the principal amount
of the debt instruments was reduced, and Best Products Co., Inc. and SCI Television Inc., each an exchange wherein the principal amount of the debt instruments
was unchanged.
14 Certain states have addressed this holdout problem. For example, under Delaware law, a corporate charter may contain a provision wherein a court may order a
meeting of creditors and/or stockholders to vote on a proposed workout or exchange offer, which vote, if by a requisite statutory majority, will bind all such creditors and/or stockholders, including dissenters, as well as the company, to the terms
of the workout or exchange offer. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(2) (1983); see
also Weingarten, supra note 12, at 162 n.20.
15 Because of applicable state corporate law or the requirements of the charter
and/or bylaws of the debtor, a very high percentage of acceptances - a "super
majority" - is often required for approval of an exchange offer. Moreover, because of the economic consequences of the holdout problem, a debtor may itself
wish to condition the exchange on an even higher acceptance rate - sometimes
ninety percent or more.
16 The federal income tax treatment of a fair market value exchange, in general,
causes the issuer to recognize the amount of the debt reduction as taxable income.
Several exceptions to this rule exist and issuers often try to avoid the harsh impact
of such rule by structuring the exchange offer in a way to avoid or defer the attendant tax liability. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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exchange without receiving at least some additional consideration (such as equity in the company) as an inducement to tender
their old bonds.
In comparison, a relatively healthy company that is experiencing temporary liquidity problems may be successful in a face
value exchange. Although relief from liquidity problems in the
form of longer payment terms and deferred interest can be
achieved, the company in this situation
will remain fully liable for
7
the original funds borrowed.'
The Chateaugay decision has made it far less attractive for
public debt holders to participate in a proposed face value exchange by, in effect, penalizing such holders for their participation. Chateaugay holds that "original issue discount" ("OID") is
created when old debt is exchanged for new debt of like face
amount, with the result that, in a subsequent bankruptcy, holders
who exchanged will have a lower claim than those who did not,
even though the overall debt obligation of the company has not
been altered.' 8 This lower claim will be equal to the market value
of the old bond on the date of the exchange.' 9 Chateaugay thus
creates an inequality of treatment among similarly situated creditors of a debtor which attempts a consensual non-bankruptcy
workout by offering a face value exchange and thereafter files for
bankruptcy protection.20
The problem created by Chateaugay has been magnified by
recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code.2 ' Previously,
in an exchange offer, the issue price of the new security was
deemed to be at least equal to the adjusted issue price of the
original (exchanged) security, and the exchange was tax-free to
the debtor. 2 Now, as a result of the amendment, a publicly
traded new security issued in an exchange offer is deemed to
have an issue price equal to its fair market value (which will genThe tax consequences of a face value exchange prior to enactment of the OMgenerally have been less clear than the treatment of fair market value
exchanges. See infra notes 44 and 53 and accompanying text.
18 In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 Bankr. 51, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also In
re Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 3 Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 73, 424 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1990); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989),
appeal docketed, No. 89-1781 (W.D. Pa.).
19 Chateaugay, 109 Bankr. at 58.
20 Chateaugay does not address the case of the fair market value exchange. As
noted above, in that situation, the debtor will in fact have reduced its principal debt
obligation and the norm would be a lower claim in bankruptcy for those who agree
to the exchange.
21 OMNIBUS ACT, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11325(a).
22 I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) (prior to amendment by the OMNIBUS ACT).
17

NIBUS ACT
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erally be equal to the value of the security on the first day that it
trades), and the company will realize taxable income from discharge of indebtedness.23 In addition, the impact of these
amendments on exchanging bondholders is analogous to the impact of Chateaugay. The amendments create a disincentive to participate in an exchange offer because the exchanging
bondholders will be required to recognize as income in each year
an allocable portion of the OID created as a result of the
exchange.24
II.

ORIGINAL ISSUE DiscouNT

Central to the inequitable treatment of creditors participating in exchange offers noted above is the concept of OID. OID is
an economic term used to express the difference between the
consideration received by the issuer of a debt instrument, before
issuance expenses, and the stated principal amount, or face
value, of that instrument.25 This difference is commonly referred
to as an instrument's "discount." Since this discount is incurred
23 After amendment by the OMNIBUS AcT, the Internal Revenue Code provides,
"[f]or purposes of determining income of a debtor from discharge of indebtedness,
if a debtor issues a debt instrument in satisfaction of indebtedness, such debtor
shall be treated as having satisfied the indebtedness with an amount of money equal
to the issue price of such debt instrument." I.R.C. § 108(e)(l 1). Except as otherwise indicated, all references to the Internal Revenue Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended through the date of publication of this article.
The issue price of the new debt instrument is its fair market value if it is publicly traded. If the publicly traded debt instrument was issued for property (as in
the case of an exchange offer), the fair market value is determined by reference to
the fair market value of such property. I.R.C. § 1273(b)(3). If the publicly traded
new debt instrument is not issued for property, the fair market value is determined
with reference to the price paid by the first buyer of the debt instrument. I.R.C.
§ 1273(b)(2). If neither the new debt nor the old debt is publicly traded, its issue
price is equal to its face amount, provided that the instrument carries a stated interest rate at least equal to the Applicable Federal Rate ("AFR"). I.R.C. § 1274(a).
The AFR is a statutorily mandated interest rate which is published each month by
the Treasury Department and is generally used by the time value of money provisions of the I.R.C. as a benchmark for current prevailing market interest rates. See
I.R.C. § 1274(d). If the new debt does not carry a sufficient interest rate, an imputed principal amount will be calculated to be the issue price of the instrument.
The calculation essentially discounts the stated redemption price at maturity to a
present value as of the issue date using the AFR as the discount rate.
24 Because a non-publicly traded debt instrument may have an issue price in
excess of its fair market value, cancellation of indebtedness income and creation of
OID may be avoided in an exchange offer if neither the new debt nor the old debt
instruments trade publicly. The definition of "publicly traded" is ambiguous, however, and the absolute removal of an investor's liquidity may well serve as a greater
disincentive to an exchange offer than the adverse tax consequences to be avoided.
25 In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 Bankr. 51, 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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by the issuing company and is part of its economic cost of borrowing, the amount of this discount is, in economic terms, imputed to the borrower as the unstated interest expense to be
accrued over the life of the debt instrument and paid at its
26
maturity.
Bonds or debentures are issued at a discount when the
promised rate of interest is, due to conditions in the prevailing
market or certain risks associated with the debt instruments, too
low to sell at par.27 Thus, the discount on the bonds in the form
of a reduced purchase price from the face value of the bonds is
"in the nature of additional interest which accrues over the life of
the bond and is payable at the maturity of the principal
obligation. "28

For example, assume that, in 1990, ABC Corp. issues $1,000
face amount debentures due in 1994 with an interest rate of
12%. The debentures are issued at $700 for each $1,000 face
amount based upon the market's estimation of the value of the
issuer's credit and prevailing market interest rates. The original
issue discount, the difference between the face amount and the
actual issue price, is $300, which represents the imputed interest
26 See Slagle, Accountingfor Interest: An Analysis of OriginalIssue Discount in the Sale of
Property, 32 S.D.L. REV. 1, 21, n. 108 (1987) ("The amount of the discount represents compensation to the Lender for the use and forbearance of money, i.e., interest."); see also United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965)
("Earned original issue discount serves the same function as stated interest...; it is
simply 'compensation for the use or forbearance of money.' ") (quoting Deputy v.
duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940)); Helvering v. Union Pacific Co., 293 U.S. 282
(1934) ("The difference between the capital realized by the issue and par value,
which is to be paid at maturity, must be added to the aggregate coupon payments in
order to arrive at the total interest paid."); cf. Old Colony R.R. v. Comm'r, 284 U.S.
552, 560-61 (1931) ("And as respects 'interest,' the usual import of the term is the
amount which one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money.").
27 Chateaugay, 109 Bankr. at 55 ("the 'market' is telling the issuer that the stated
rate of interest is too low, and the differential between consideration paid for the
debenture and the amount received by the purchaser at maturity is intended to
compensate the purchaser for buying a debenture with a stated interest rate below
market levels").
28 Id. at 56-57 (quoting American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. United States, 130
F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1942)); accord Slagle, supra note 26, at 31 (" 'Original issue
discount' may be thought of as interest income and expense which is accrued but
unpaid.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The concept of OID should be
distinguished from that of a market discount. A market discount is one at which an
investor buys a debt instrument (for a price less than the stated principal amount)
in the secondary market as opposed to buying from the original issuer. While there
is no difference to the investor as to whether he captures a market discount or OID,
market discount, unlike OID, has no effect on the balance sheet or borrowing cost
of the issuer. Thus, a market discount has no effect on an issuer in the context of a
subsequent bankruptcy.
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to be earned by the debentureholder over the life of the
debenture.2 9
III.
A.

TREATMENT OF

OID IN BANKRUPTCY

In General

The concept of OID takes on special meaning in the context
of the claims allowance process in a chapter 11 case under the
Code. Section 502 of the Code, which establishes the framework
for the allowance of claims in a chapter 11 case, provides, in part,
that a claim in bankruptcy will be disallowed if "such claim is for
unmatured interest." 3 Thus, to the extent that OID is considered the economic equivalent of "unmatured interest," such OID
3
will be disallowed as a claim in bankruptcy. '
B.

Chateaugay

Chateaugay and other recent case law squarely hold that OID
is in fact "unmatured interest" for purposes of the Code.32 Each
29 The debt instrument in this example contains a stated or contractual interest
rate for which interim interest payments are generally made. OID, however, is
most clearly illustrated in the case of zero coupon bonds for which interim interest
payments are not made, and which are usually redeemed for a balloon payment at a
stated maturity date, which is higher than the original issue price of the bonds. The
difference between the balloon payment and original issue price, or "unstated interest," is generally presumed to represent the "time value" which is placed upon
the use of the consideration paid for the period during which it is held. In the
context of a zero coupon debt instrument, or any debt instrument that does not
carry a stated interest rate sufficient to induce the market to purchase the instrument for a price at least equal to the stated redemption price at maturity, OID
represents the various contingent risks involved in such an investment and is, in
fact, the marketplace's measurement of the "time value" or "unstated interest" of
that particular debt instrument. See, e.g., Slagle, supra note 26, at 21.
30 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1988).
31 The Code does not explicitly define "unmatured interest." However, the legislative history discussing the enactment of section 502(b)(2) provides:
Paragraph (2) requires disallowance to the extent that the claim is for
unmatured interest as of the date of the petition. Whether interest is
matured or unmatured on the date of bankruptcy is to be determined
without reference to any zpsofacto or bankruptcy clause in the agreement creating the claim. Interest disallowed under this paragraph includes
post-petition interest that is not yet due and payable, and any portion of prepaid
interest that represents an original discounting of the claim, yet that would not
have been earned on the date of bankruptcy.
H.R.REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 352 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963,
6308-09 (emphasis added).
32 See Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 3 Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,266;
Chateaugay, 109 Bankr. at 55; Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. at 250, 255. A number
of other cases have implicitly assumed, without detailed discussion or analysis, that
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of these cases relied upon the specific example provided in the
legislative history of section 502(b)(2) as "unmatured interest."
For example, a claim on a $1,000 note issued the day before
bankruptcy would only be allowed to the extent of the cash
actually advanced. If the original discount was 10 percent so
that the cash advanced was only $900, then notwithstanding
the face amount of the note, only $900 would be allowed. If
$900 was advanced under the note some time before bankruptcy, the interest component of the note would have to be
pro-rated and disallowed to the extent it was for interest after
the commencement of the case.3 3
Relying upon this textual example, the bankruptcy court in each of
these three cases concluded that, because the face value of the bond
instruments in question was greater than the market value of such
bonds at the date of issue,, the difference must be considered unstated interest under the OID doctrine. Accordingly, to the extent
that the imputed interest in the particular bond instruments at issue
was unamortized as of the date the bankruptcy petition had been
filed, such interest was deemed to be "unmatured" and therefore
was disallowed under section 502(b)(2) of the Code. 4
Chateaugay goes further, however, and holds that in a face value
exchange, additional OID is created."5 In Chateaugay, the debtor offered to the holders of its outstanding sinking fund debentures the
any portion of a debt obligation which represents unamortized interest is barred by
section 502(b)(2). See, e.g., In re Texaco Inc., 73 Bankr. 960, 965-67 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (attempt by debtholders to trigger provision of notes which allowed
acceleration of unaccrued interest upon default of debtor); see also In re Clausel, 32
Bankr. 805, 808-11 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1983) (calculating refund of accelerated
finance charges in an installment loan contract); cf. In re Watson, 32 Bankr. 491, 493
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (calculating accrued interest on a promissory note secured
by residential mortgage).
33 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 352-53 (1977); S. REP. No. 95989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6308-09, quoted in Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 3 Bankr. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 87,266; Chateaugay, 109 Bankr. at 55; and Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. at
250.
34 See Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 3 Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,266 ("The
word 'interest' in the statute is clearly sufficient to encompass the OID variation in
the method of providing for and collecting what in economic fact is interest to be
paid to compensate for the delay and risk involved in the ultimate repayment of
monies loaned."); Chateaugay, 109 Bankr. at 55 ("[I]n the fact situation before this
Court, unamortized original issue discount on a note or debenture is indeed unmatured interest which is not an allowable claim under Bankruptcy Code
§ 502(b)(2).") (emphasis omitted); Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. at 250 ("The facts
of the instant case fit squarely within the example contained in the legislative history. The legislative history is clear; original issue discount is unmatured interest
which is disallowed under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2).").
35 Chateaugay, 109 Bankr. at 56-57.
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opportunity to participate in an exchange offer in which for each
$1,000 principal of debentures, a bondholder would receive $1,000
face amount of 15% senior notes (plus a number of shares of common stock). Approximately seventy-seven percent of the old debentures were so exchanged. Thereafter, despite the successful
exchange, the debtor filed for protection under chapter 11. The
indenture trustees for both the old debentures and the new notes
subsequently filed proofs of claim roughly equal to the aggregate
face value of the debentures and notes (or roughly the aggregate
amount of the company's balance sheet obligation). Over the
debtor's objection, the court held that the issuance of the old debentures created OID which could be disallowed pursuant to section 502(b)(2) of the Code, and that, as a result of the debt-for-debt
exchange offer, additional OID was created with respect to the new
notes based upon the difference between the fair market value on
the date of issue of the new notes (the date of the exchange) and
their face amount, the unamortized portion of which was also disallowable under the Code. The fair market value of the new notes was
to be measured by the market value of the old notes on the date of
the exchange.3 6
The court found that the exchange constituted the issuance of
new debt rather than merely a modification of the old debt instrument because maturity dates, interest rate and sinking fund requirements were all materially changed, and rejected an argument that
the exchange was merely a bookkeeping entry which should be accorded no economic significance.3 7 In addition, the court held that
36 Id. at 58. The various holdings in Chateaugay were resolved on summary judgment, with the exception of the actual amount of OID to be applied to the new
notes. There was a factual dispute as to the value of the old debentures on the date
of the exchange, which needed to be determined by further proceedings. Id.
37 id. at 56, In reality, this finding ignores the fact that, in a conventional private
debt restructuring, for bankruptcy purposes material changes in payment terms are
never considered the issuance of a new debt instrument. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, for federal income tax purposes, if new debt instruments
"differ materially" from the old debt instruments surrendered, a taxable exchange
will be deemed to have occurred. Treas. Reg. § 1001-1(a) ("Except as otherwise
provided in subtitle A of the Code, the gain or loss realized from the conversion of
property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing
materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or as loss sustained.").
The fact that an exchange offer contemplates the physical exchange of one debt
instrument for another is not controlling. It is the difference in the terms of the
debt instruments that will govern whether a taxable exchange has occurred. Rev.
Rul. 73-160, 1973-1 C.B. 365 ("The income tax liability resulting from a particular
transaction involving a change in the terms of outstanding securities is not controlled entirely by the mechanical means used for the accomplishment of the
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the accretion of amortized OD in the pre-petition period should be
calculated on a "yield-to-maturity basis", also known as the "constant interest", "effective interest" and "economic accrual"
method.3 8 Unlike the straight-line method of accounting, the yieldto-maturity basis may reduce a claim in bankruptcy even further because, under such calculation, amortization of the discount occurs
more slowly with larger "interest" accruals occurring later in the life
of the bond.-9 Thus, to the extent that a chapter 11 filing follows
change."); see also, G.C.M. 37884 (March 19, 1979) ("The 'materially different' portion of [the] Regulation in the context of debt obligations ... does not turn on
whether or not there was a physical exchange. A contrary construction would elevate form over substance, a result we cannot sanction.") Although all of the facts
and circumstances of any given exchange are relevant to the determination of
whether an exchange has occurred for tax purposes, the various judicial authorities
and rulings by the Internal Revenue Service have indicated that the taxable threshold is an easy one to cross. See, e.g., FNMA v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 405, 422 (1988);
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-1(c)(2); Rev. Rul. 73-160, 1973-1 C.B. 365; Rev. Rul.
87-19, 1987-1 C.B. 249; Rev. Rul. 81-169, 1981-1 C.B. 429 (9% bond exchanged
for 8.5% new bond with 10 year extension of maturity date); Ltr. Rul. 8731011, Ltr.
Rul. 8907049, Ltr. Rul. 8920047.
38 Chateaugay, 109 Bankr. at 57-58.
39 The "constant interest" method of determining the amortization of the OID
assumes that interest is compounded over time, thus calculating that "the amount
of interest which accrues each year increases with the passage of time," and that
"with each subsequent year, the amount of interest which accrues is greater than
the amount of interest which accrued in an earlier year." Slagle, supra note 26, at
19. The Internal Revenue Code requires the OID be accounted for on a yield-tomaturity basis, assigning a pro-rated portion of the total OID inherent in the debt
instrument to each day that the instrument is outstanding. I.R.C. § 1272(a). In
contrast, the "straight line" method utilized by the Allegheny court is based upon the
assumption that simple interest is the appropriate method of amortizing the OID,
thus concluding that the same amount of interest accrues during each day of the
entire term of the debt instrument. Allegheny Int'l. Inc., 100 Bankr. at 254-55. See
generally Slagle, supra note 26, at 17 ("Simple interest is computed by applying the
rate of interest only to the principal amount of the debt. Conversely, compound
interest is computed by applying the rate of interest to the total amount of the
outstanding obligation, including both principal and accrued interest.") (footnotes
omitted). The Allegheny court adopted the straight line method based on the statement in the legislative history of section 502(b)(2) of the Code that the "interest
component of the note would have to be prorated and disallowed to the extent it
was for interest after the commencement of the case." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 352-53 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978),
reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5963, 6308-09, cited with approval

in Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 Bankr. at 254. After noting that the definition of "prorate" is "to divide, distribute or assess proportionately," the Allegheny court
adopted the straight line method on the apparent basis that such method best prorates the accrued interest over the term of the loan. Id. (quoting Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary, 924 (1975)), The straight line method has been strongly criticized. See,
e.g., Slagle, supra note 26, at 24 ("Hence, the [straight line] method distorts the
amount of interest which accrues each year because it accrues an equal amount of
interest each year, without regard to the outstanding balance owing to the obligation. Furthermore, the [straight line] method serves to distort the rate of interest
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closely on the heels of an exchange offer, virtually the entire amount
of the "discount" could be deemed unamortized and thus
disallowed.
Chateaugay relied on § 1273(b) of the Internal Revenue Code to
provide the basis for establishing that the issue price of one security
issued in exchange for another having the same principal amount is
the fair market value of the old security. 40 Inexplicably, however,
the court failed to consider the exception provided by § 1275(a)(4)
of the Internal Revenue Code 4 1 for determining the issue price of
debt securities issued in tax free reorganizations, including recapitalizations, 42 for which most exchange offers at the time of Chateaugay qualified.43 In such recapitalizations, the issue price of the new
bond would never be lower than the adjusted issue price of the old
bond given in exchange.4 4
accrual by accelerating the amount of interest income which is reported in the earlier years.").
40 Section 1273(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides, in part:
In the case of a debt instrument which is issued for property and
which ... is part of an issue a portion of which is traded on an established securities market . . .the issue price of such debt instrument
shall be the fair market value of such property.
I.R.C. § 1273(b)(3).
41 I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) (prior to amendment by the OMNIBus ACT).
42 I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(E).
43 Chateaugay also erroneously relied on the Allegheny decision since Allegheny is
clearly distinguishable on its facts. Chateaugay, 109 Bankr. at 55-56. In Allegheny,
the debtor offered to exchange certain debt instruments for previously issued preferred stock. Subsequent to the completion of the exchange offer, the debtor filed
for chapter 11 protection. The indenture trustee thereafter filed a proof of claim
for the face amount of the debentures, and the debtor objected, claiming the OID
was created as a result of the exchange, the unamortized portion of which was disallowable pursuant to section 502(b)(2) of the Code. The court agreed and fixed the
indenture trustee's claim at the difference between the face value of the new notes
minus the selling price of the preferred stock plus any accrued OID. Allegheny Int'l
Inc., 100 Bankr. at 253-54.
In Allegheny, however, the exchange offer was a debt-for-equity exchange. Prior
to the exchange, equity holders had an interest in, but not a claim against, the debtor.
The debtor obviously had no obligation to repay. Therefore, the only "claim" was
created at the time of the exchange, and the discount arose as a result of the true
"original" issuance of the debentures; the balance sheet of the debtor reflected an
increase in its liabilities for the first time.
On the other hand, in Chateaugay, the exchange offer was a debt-for-debt swap;
the debtor's balance sheet was unaffected. Unlike Allegheny, the "discount" purportedly created in Chateaugay did not arise as a result of the "original" issuance of
the debentures - the Chateaugay "discount" was, in fact, a result of the modification of a claim created upon the original issuance of the old debentures. The court
simply failed to recognize this crucial distinction. See Phelan and Jernigan, supra
note 5, at 6-7.
44 Prior to its repeal by the OMNIBUS ACT, I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) provided that:
If (i) any debt instrument is issued pursuant to a plan of reorganiza-
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As noted above, § 1275(a)(4) was repealed after Chateaugay was
decided. 45 Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, if § 1275(a)(4) had
been repealed at the time of Chateaugay, Chateaugay's reliance on the
tax treatment of OID in an exchange offer would have been accurate. On the other hand, there is no compelling need for the bankruptcy treatment and tax treatment of OID to be similar and, for
policy reasons, they should not be similar here. 46 Bankruptcy policy is rooted in the fair and equitable treatment of all creditors who
are similarly situated. For this purpose, the nature of the claim has
traditionally been examined from the date the original obligation
was incurred. 4 7 Tax considerations, however, have a totally differtion... for another debt instrument (... the "old debt instrument"),
and (ii) the amount which (but for this paragraph) would be the issue
price of the debt instrument so issued is less than the adjusted issue
price of the old debt instrument, then the issue price of the debt instrument so issued shall be treated as equal to the adjusted issue price
of the old debt instrument.
I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4). One of the immediate consequences of the repeal of I.R.C.
§ 1275(a)(4) is to create OID in instances where new debt instruments are issued in
face value exchanges. This will have the effect of requiring the bondholder to recognize as taxable income the portion of the OID attributable to each tax year that
the debt instrument is held. Because OID income is "phantom income," i.e. income for tax purposes that is not accompanied by receipt of a cash payment, the
repeal of I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) will make face value exchange offers much less attractive to creditors than has historically been the case. While the creation of OID may
be an incentive for fair market value exchanges, the consequences to the creditors
is not affected by whether or not the exchange occurs within the confines of title 11
and, accordingly, will not be addressed herein.
45 OMNiBus Acr § 11325(a).
46 Numerous cases have held that the bankruptcy treatment and tax treatment of
a single transaction need not necessarily be similar. See, e.g., In re PCH Associates,
55 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that the transaction constituted a joint venture rather than an unexpired lease for
purposes of § 365(d) of the Code, notwithstanding that the transaction was structured in form of ground lease to achieve certain benefits allowed under the tax
laws); In re Tucker, 34 Bankr. 257, 262 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) ("Although ...
the lessor took an investment tax credit and the lessee has deducted lease rentals
for income tax purposes, these few indicators are not persuasive compared with the
volley of indicators of a security."); In re Keydata Corp., 18 Bankr. 907, 909 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1982) (purported "lease" held to be a financing arrangement in spite of
the fact that "lessor" took all the tax advantages of a lease and carried the sale
transaction on its books as a bona fide sale); Fox v. Peck Iron and Metal Co., Inc.,
25 Bankr. 674, 682 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (purported "sale-leaseback" held to be
a financing arrangement in spite of the fact that the parties' books of account and,
for some time, their tax returns, recorded the transaction as a sale and leaseback).
47 See In re Franklin Bldg. Co., 178 F.2d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1949) (holding
that bondholder claims bought at a discount properly allowed for full face amount
in absence of evidence that bondholders were acting in a fiduciary capacity at the
time of purchase); In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55, 5758 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 708 (1945) ("The property right of a bondholder
is the right to receive from the debtor the entire amount the latter has promised to
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ent purpose and focus. While the bankruptcy laws are concerned
with maintaining the relative differences in status and priority
among similarly situated creditors, the tax laws are concerned with
establishing a consistent system of accounting for increases and decreases in the wealth of discrete taxpayers, in order to impose a tax
on their respective net increases. Central to this system of taxation
is the concept that "inchoate" or "unrealized" gains or losses are
not generally to be included in the calculation of a taxpayer's income whereas "realized" gains are. The requirement that a "realization event" occurs before it is appropriate to tax a sale or
exchange transaction has been included in the income tax laws since
they were first enacted.4 8 As long as the realization event has occurred, however, and the amount of gain or loss realized by a taxpayer can be measured, the tax laws require that the tax
consequences of the transaction be determined unless some overriding economic policy requires that the realized gains or losses be
deferred and not recognized currently.4 9 Therefore, although an
exchange offer may present a proper time to tax the participants,
that fact is not relevant in the bankruptcy analysis of the relationship
that similarly situated creditors have to one another and to the
debtor.
A further flaw in Chateaugay is its failure to appreciate that the
exchange offer caused no reduction in the liabilities of Chateaugay,
and hence, no change on its balance sheet. In fact, since Chateaugay
involved a face value exchange, the actual liability of the debtor to
its old and new bondholders remained the same - the original face
amount of the debt less the unamortized OID pertaining to the original debt.
Yet, by reducing the claims of the exchanged bonds under the
guise of the creation of additional OID, Chateaugay has the effect of
reducing a liability to its subsequent fair market value. This result
pay. In the absence of some equitable reason ... the prices which security holders
pay for their securities in no wise affects the measure of their participation in reorganization ....");In re Executive Office Centers, Inc., 96 Bankr. 642, 649 (Bankr.
E.D. La. 1988) (declining to limit the full value of an assigned claim against the
estate in the absence of fraud or evidence of inadequate consideration); see also In re
Dorr Pump & Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1942) (holding that a claim in
the hands of a purchaser or assignee has the same rights and liabilities as it did in
the hands of the original claimant); Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695, 720 (8th Cir.
1942) (same).
48 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1921, § 206(a)(6), 42 Stat. 227, 232 (imposing a requirement of a sale or exchange before a capital gain could be recognized).
49 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a). See supra note 37, for a discussion of when an
exchange offer constitutes a realization event for tax purposes.
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violates a major precept of the Code: the Code does not contemplate the valuation of liabilities; neither the interest rate, maturity
date nor market value affects the initial amount of the claim against
the company. 5° Traditional bankruptcy policy considerations with
respect to the allowance of claims are instead intended to fix the
obligations of a debtor as of the petition date by determining the
amount of claims in bankruptcy and precluding the accretion of
post-petition interest on particular claims. 5
While the new note terms are in fact materially different, viewed
from the perspective of the debtor, the amount of money borrowed
and owed has not changed. Renegotiation of private institutional
debt, with the original principal amount remaining the same, also
recognizes the absence of any impact on the balance sheet of the
debtor. Previously, it has not been suggested that renegotiated private debt should be reduced upon a subsequent bankruptcy to the
fair market value of the debt at the time of the restructuring. However, taken to its logical extreme, and directly contrary to the traditional statutory analysis for allowing claims in bankruptcy, the
Chateaugay analysis could, in a subsequent bankruptcy, require that
every general unsecured creditor's claim that has been modified or
otherwise adjusted be fixed at the fair market value of that claim on
the date of bankruptcy.
To illustrate, consider the example of a bank which has extended a $100 million unsecured line of credit to a debtor. Based
upon the value of the debtor's assets and prevailing conditions in
the credit markets, the "fair market value" of the bank's claim is $60
million. Now suppose that the debtor renegotiates the payment
terms of the debt with the bank, extending the final repayment by
50 Fortgang & Mayer, Valuations in Bankruptcy, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1061, 1094-95
(1985).
51 The legislative history to section 502(b)(2) of the Code provides, in part:
Section 502(b) thus contains two principles of present law. First, interest stops accruing at the date of the filing of the petition, because
any claim for unmatured interest is disallowed under this paragraph.
Second, bankruptcy operates as the acceleration of the principal
amount of all claims against the debtor. One unarticulated reason for
this is that the discounting factor for claims after the commencement
of the case is equivalent to contractual interest rate on the claim.
Thus, this paragraph does not cause disallowance of claims that have
not been discounted to a present value because of the irrefutable presumption that the discounting rate and the contractual interest rate
(even a zero interest rate) are equivalent.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 353 (1977); S. REP.. No. 95-989, 95th

Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.
6308-09.
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two years, and declaring a one-year interest holiday. Six months
later, the debtor files for chapter 11 protection. Under current
bankruptcy law, the bank has a principal claim in bankruptcy of $ 100
million. Under a Chateaugay analysis, if taken to its logical extreme,
the modifications to the line of credit could be deemed to constitute
an exchange of a new obligation for the old obligation, resulting in a
limitation of the bank's claim to $60 million, the fair market value of
the claim. 5 2
More importantly, though, the Chateaugay decision exacerbates
the holdout problem in an exchange offer by penalizing those creditors who do participate in an exchange offer and providing even
greater rewards for those who do not. By revaluing only the face
value exchangor's claim downward while leaving the holdout's claim
intact, the court creates a windfall for the non-exchanging holdout
in a subsequent bankruptcy. The result also creates a windfall for
the company by relieving its debt measured by the additional OID.
Thus, Chateaugay gives creditors a disincentive to cooperate with a
struggling debtor in a consensual workout and gives an artificial
benefit to the debtor.
In addition to the Chateaugay disincentive, the repeal of I.R.C.
§ 1275(a)(4) will also directly impact the ability of a debtor to participate in exchange offers. Because I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4) had set the
issue price (or deemed fair value) of the new debt to be no lower
than the adjusted issue price of the old debt (the deemed principal
amount) outstanding, discharge of indebtedness income generally
was not created in a public debt exchange.5 3 With the repeal of
§ 1275(a)(4), however, the issue price of the new debt will generally
be its fair market value and the debt discharge income will be real52 See Phelan and Jernigan, supra note 5, at 607. Chateaugay brushed aside this
argument by noting the significant changes made to the new notes (revised maturity dates, and modified interest rate and sinking fund requirements), and by stating
that other cases such as compromised trade claims were not before the Chateaugay
court. In re Chateaugay, 109 Bankr. 55, 56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
53 When a corporation satisfies its outstanding indebtedness with cash or property with a fair market value of less than the principal amount of the debt outstanding, the corporation generally is required to recognize taxable income from the
discharge of indebtedness. I.R.C. § 61 (a) (12). Because a debt exchange (whether a
face value or a fair market value exchange) typically involves the retirement of old
debt when it is trading at a discount, the risk of creation of taxable income is virtually always present.
The applicable Treasury Regulations explicitly include in the definition of discharge of indebtedness income the rule that: "If bonds are issued by a corporation
and are subsequently repurchased by the corporation at a price which is exceeded
by the issue price plus any amount of discount already deducted ... the amount of
such excess is income for the taxable year." Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(3).
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ized, unless the debtor is insolvent or in bankruptcy, in which case
the income so realized may be either eliminated or deferred, depending on the structure of the transaction. 54
As a result of the
repeal of I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4), income from cancellation of indebtedness may no longer be avoided merely because the exchange offer
constitutes a tax-free recapitalization transaction. Debtors that engage in exchange offers will be required to recognize all cancellation
of indebtedness income that is realized on the exchange if they are
not sufficiently insolvent or if the exchanges are not consummated
in a title 11 proceeding.5 5 Concluding the debt exchange under the
auspices of title 11 will secure the exclusion from the current recognition of discharge of indebtedness income without the debtor having to admit to and prove the degree of its insolvency with all of the
attendant risks of doing so.
IV.

CONSEQUENCES

A debenture claim should be allowed at an amount equal to
54 If a debtor is insolvent or if the exchange occurs under the auspices of a title
I 1 case, two provisions of the tax laws provide relief from the recognition of debt
discharge income. In both instances, if insolvency is relied on for relief, such relief
will only be available to the extent the debtor is insolvent. I.R.C. § 108(a)(3). The
first form of relief, the "stock-for-debt exception," is absolute. If the debtor issues
more than a de minimis amount of its stock to the creditors as part of the consideration in the exchange, the amount of debt discharged in excess of the fair market
value of the cash, stock, new debt and other property issued is deemed discharged
by the stock issued. I.R.C. § 108(e)(8) and § 108(e)(10)(B). Recently issued proposed regulations help to define what constitutes de minimis stock issuances. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 108 (proposed December, 1990). The OMNIBUs ACT also restricted
the use of certain types of stock in exchanges that qualify for the stock for debt
exception. OMNIBUs ACT § 11325(b)(1), adding new I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(B)(ii). See
also Rev. Rul. 90-87, 1990 - C.B. -, limiting the use of preferred stock in stockfor-debt exception exchanges. If a transaction does not qualify for the "stock-fordebt exception," insolvent taxpayers and those in title 11 cases are, nonetheless,
permitted to exclude from income any debt discharge income. I.R.C.
§ 108(a)(1)(A)(B). The effect of such exclusion, however, is tempered by the fact
that the debtor's tax attributes must be reduced by the amount of the income so
excluded. I.R.C. § 108(b). The reduction of tax attributes, including net operating
losses, tax credits and the debtor's tax basis in its assets, has the effect of deferring
and not eliminating the debt discharge income. It should be noted that, if outside
of title 11, the exclusion from gross income only applies to the extent that the
debtor is insolvent. I.R.C. § 108(a)(3). Insolvency for this purpose is the excess of
the debtor's liabilities over the fair market value of its assets, determined immediately prior to the exchange.
55 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Unless a debtor is under title 11,
the tax protection from debt discharge income that is available is limited to the
amount by which the debtor's assets actually exceed its liabilities immediately prior
to the exchange. Therefore, the issue of solvency will often govern the tax
treatment.
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the original obligation created for the amount of money originally borrowed (less the true original unamortized OID), as provided in the Code, notwithstanding any participation in a face
value exchange offer. To hold otherwise, as does Chateaugay, results in disparate treatment for non-exchanging creditors since
the exchanged claims may be further reduced simply by virtue of
the exchange, and a windfall is created for the debtor. This result directly violates the basic bankruptcy tenets that all similarlysituated creditors should be treated alike and that the claims in
bankruptcy should relate to the original incurrence of the obligation.56 Assuming Chateaugay is not reversed and there is no legislative correction to the repeal of I.R.C. § 1275(a)(4),
bankruptcies will undoubtedly increase when distressed companies are faced with recalcitrant debentureholders who are unwilling to consent to an out-of-court restructuring because of the
discriminatory treatment compared with non-exchanging holders, and because debt exchanges as part of a bankruptcy plan are
the only sure way today to avoid, or at least defer, the unfavorable tax treatment described above.
These factors will undoubtedly accelerate the trend toward
5 7
the ever increasing use of pre-packaged bankruptcy plans.

56 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. The notion of equality of treatment
among similarly situated creditors runs throughout various provisions of the Code.
For example, section 1122(a) of the Code requires that a reorganization plan provide for the classification of all similar claims within a particular class under the
plan so that the treatment of those claims is consistent. See In re B&W Enterprises,
Inc., 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1983) (the Code "requires that a chapter 11 plan
must 'provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class.'
11 U.S.C. § 1123. There is no indication that Congress intended the courts to fashion their own rules of super-priorities within any given priority class.") (quoting 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUrCY
507.02 (15th ed. 1979)). In addition, section 1129(b)(1)
sets forth the confirmation requirement that a plan (which otherwise meets statutory requirements) may be confirmed only if it does not unfairly discriminate
among creditors and it is fair and equitable. See In re Pine Lake Village Apartment
Co., 19 Bankr. 819, 831 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that the creation of separate classes of unsecured claims "in order to allow gamesmanship in vote getting is
not condoned under the Code [and] ... is unfairly discriminatory within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)").
57 During the past year, there has been an increasing use of pre-packaged chapter 11 plans, presumably to limit the time spent in bankruptcy and to realize the
significant cost savings of avoiding a full blown bankruptcy. In re The Southland
Corporation, No. 390.37119-A-11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.) (Dallas Division); In re
LaSalle Energy Corp., No. 90-05508-H3-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.); In re Republic
Health Corp., No. 389-38127-F-II (Bankr. N.D. Tex.) (Dallas Division); In re Kroy
Inc., et al., Nos. 90-5034-PHX-RGM through 90-5035-PHX-RGM (Bankr.D. Ariz.).
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CASES

A pre-packaged chapter 1I is a procedure designed to conduct a largely out-of-court restructuring which is subsequently
consummated under the authority of a bankruptcy court without
invoking the procedures of a full-blown bankruptcy case.5" As a
practical matter, the pre-packaged bankruptcy unfolds in a manner similar to an out-of-court exchange offer: there is a negotiation with major bondholders, the preparation of offering
literature (a combination exchange offer and disclosure statement) and the negotiation of a plan. 59 A pre-packaged chapter
11, if successful, solves many of the problems inherent in an outof-court restructuring without the cost, delay and uncertainty of a
58 Unlike a pre-packaged plan, in a typical full-blown chapter I I case, a petition
is typically filed before negotiations with creditors are commenced. I1 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c)(3) (1988). Over a lengthy period of time after filing, a chapter 11 company (called the "debtor" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(12)) generally negotiates the
terms of the restructuring with the statutory committees appointed under the
Code. Pursuant to section 1102(a) of the Code, the United States Trustee is required to appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims, and may,
depending on the needs of the individual case, appoint additional committees of
creditors or of equity security holders. In large and complex chapter 11 cases, multiple committees are usually appointed. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corporation,
Nos. 82 B 11656 through 82 B 11676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Committee of Unsecured
Creditors, Asbestos Health Litigants Committee and Equity Committee, each appointed by the United States Trustee under section 1102 of the Code; the Unofficial Co-defendants Committee was appointed pursuant to section 1109(b) of the
Code); In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., and Allied Stores Corporation, et
al., Nos. 1-90-00130 through 1-90-00146 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio)(Western Division)
(The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of the Federated Debtors, The
Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee of Allied Stores Corporation, The Official
Committee of Bondholders of Federated Department Stores, Inc., The Official
Committee of Bondholders of Allied Stores Corporation and The Official Committee of Federated Pre-Merger Bondholders, each appointed by the United States
Trustee); In re Revco D.S., Inc., et al., Nos. 588-1308 through 588-1321, 588-1305,
588-1761 through 588-1812 and 588-1820 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (The Unofficial
Committee of Secured Bank Lenders, the Official Committee of Unsecured Trade
Creditors, the Official Committee of Unsecured Noteholders and the Unofficial
Preferred Equity Committee, two of which were appointed by the United States
Trustee). These committees and their retained legal, accounting and investment
banking professionals investigate all aspects of the debtor's financial condition and
negotiate the terms of a reorganization plan with the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103
(setting out the duties of chapter 11 committees). Moreover, each and every business transaction out of the ordinary course of the debtor's business requires court
approval under section 363 of the Code and executory contracts must either be
assumed or rejected by the debtor under section 365 of the Code. As a result, the
chapter 11 process is generally protracted, fraught with uncertainty, enormously
expensive and essentially requires management to operate in a "fishbowl"
atmosphere.
59 See generally Aaron supra note 8, at § 12.09; Gross, supra note 8, at 597-99;
Weingarten, supra note 12, at 161-62.
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traditional chapter 11 case.60
As noted above, one of the greatest inherent difficulties of an
6
out-of-court exchange offer is the inability to bind dissenters. '
Since Chateaugay fosters a disincentive to bondholders in the solicitation of their consent to an exchange offer, the holdout problem
will be exacerbated. Further, in an exchange offer, there are
often additional economic benefits to be obtained by refusing to
exchange. A holdout may obtain improved terms from the
debtor as a further inducement to accept the exchange. Additionally, if the exchange offer is implemented despite the existence of holdouts, the economic value of the old debt instruments
may be enhanced because the company will be in a stronger financial position after the exchange.
On the other hand, a successful reorganization under the
Code eliminates the holdout problem. If the statutory majorities
for acceptance of a plan of reorganization are achieved, the Code
62
allows the will of the majority to bind dissenting creditors.
Thus, the dissenter must exercise whatever leverage is available
to obtain the optimum return during the plan negotiation
process.
Moreover, the acceptance percentage required for a successful exchange offer is often prohibitively high.63 In contrast, for
acceptance of a plan of reorganization under the Code, (i) a class
60 Compared to a traditional chapter 11 case, confirmation of a pre-packaged
plan can be accomplished within a few months. See, e.g., In re Anglo Energy, Inc.,
No. 88 B 10360 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (pre-packaged chapter 11 plan completed in two
months), In re Republic Health Corp., No. 389-38127-F-Il (Bankr. N.D. Tex.)
(pre-packaged chapter 11 completed in four months), In re Crystal Oil Company,
No. 86-12834 (Bankr. W.D.La.) (pre-packaged chapter 11 plan completed in four
months). Thus, the enormous transaction costs of a chapter 11 case that frequently
grow exponentially with the appointment of multiple official creditor and equity
committees and the requirement of court scrutiny of major transactions can be
drastically reduced with a pre-packaged chapter 11. Many bankruptcy practitioners
have opined that a pre-packaged chapter 11 is suitable only for companies with
relatively simple capital structures. See, e.g., New York Times, November 26, 1990,
at D2, col. 1. See also Kaplan, supra note 8. For complex capital structures, Kaplan
suggests as an alternative a "pre-negotiated" plan, which is a proposed plan negotiated with ad hoc committees and filed in full or as an agreement in principle with
the bankruptcy petition. Nevertheless, pre-packaged chapter I l's have been utilized increasingly for complex recapitalizations.
61 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
62 Pursuant to § 1141 of the Code, the provisions of a confirmed plan of reorganization bind, inter alia, any creditor or equity security holder, whether or not the
claim or interest of such creditor or equity security holder is impaired under the
plan, and whether or not such creditor or equity security holder has accepted the
plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
63 See supra note 16.
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of claims has accepted a plan of reorganization if such plan has
been accepted by creditors that hold at least two-thirds in
amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims
voting, and (ii) a class of stock interests has accepted a plan if
such plan has been accepted by holders of at least two-thirds in
amount of the allowed interests voting.'
Since the pre-packaged plan is negotiated before the chapter
11 case starts, it can take advantage of all the benefits available
under the Code without the detriments of a prolonged and expensive proceeding while binding the dissenters as well, all at a
significantly lower level of required acceptances. If the pre-packaged chapter 11 proceeds promptly, significant bankruptcy court
involvement will be limited to the issue of determining compliance with section 1126 of the Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3018.
In addition, from the debtor's perspective, intensive investigation of its prebankruptcy affairs may be minimized.65 For these
reasons, over the past several years, pre-packaged chapter lI's
increasingly have been utilized by debtors in combination with or
in lieu of traditional exchange offers. 66 The use of pre-packaged
plans will undoubtedly increase to minimize the risks created by
Chateaugay and to avoid the adverse tax consequences created by
the repeal of § 1275(a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.
A.

Section 1126(b) of the Code

Section 1126(b) of the Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3018 set
out a procedural roadmap for a debtor to follow in order to consummate a pre-packaged chapter 11. Section 1126(b) of the
Code permits a debtor to formulate a plan of reorganization
prior to commencement of a chapter 11 case and to obtain acceptances or rejections of such plan by holders of claims and
interests.67

The solicitation of such acceptances or rejections must be in
64 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). There is no quorum requirement for this vote, with the
result that a relatively few creditors who have an actual interest in voting for or
against a proposed plan often can control the vote.
65 In the Anglo Energy chapter 11 case, no creditors' committee was appointed.
In Southland, a creditors' committee comprised of creditors with whom the debtor
had already negotiated in the prepetition period was appointed by the United
States Trustee as an official creditors' committee. See infra notes 72-93 and accompanying text.
66 See supra note 56.
67 The section provides:
(b) For the purposes of subsections (c) and (d) of this section, a
holder of a claim or interest that has accepted or rejected the plan
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compliance with any applicable non-bankruptcy law, rule or regulation governing disclosure of adequate information or, if there
is not any such law, such acceptance or rejection is solicited after
disclosure of adequate information to such holders pursuant to
section 1125(a) of the Code. s
B. Adequate Disclosure
Once the plan of reorganization has been formulated, the
disclosure requirements of section 1126(b) are the key to a successful pre-packaged chapter 11. Because the solicitation of the
pre-packaged plan will occur prior to the filing of the petition,
the timing of the bankruptcy court's review of the disclosure
statement is reversed. In a typical chapter 11 case, the bankruptcy court approves the disclosure statement under the adequate information standard set forth in section 1125(a) of the
Code prior to solicitation of acceptances of a plan but after the
case has been commenced.69 All creditor objections to the adebefore the commencement of the case under this title is deemed to
have accepted or rejected such plan, as the case may be, if (1) the solicitation of such acceptance or rejection was in compliance
with any applicable non-bankruptcy law, rule, or regulation governing
the adequacy of disclosure in connection with such solicitation; or
(2) if [sic] there is not any such law, rule, or regulation, such acceptance or rejection was solicited after disclosure to such holder of adequate information, as defined in section 1125(a) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (1988). Pre-packaged reorganization cases were not uncommon under the former Bankruptcy Act. The legislative history to section 1126(b)
recognized that prepetition solicitation was "common practice under (former]
Chapter XI." See, e.g., In re NJB Prime Investors, 3 Bankr. 553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1979). Prepetition solicitation was expressly authorized under Chapter XI of the
former Bankruptcy Act. See BANKRUPTCY ACT of 1898, § 97, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed
1978).
68 The effect of the securities laws on the disclosure required for a pre-packaged
chapter 11 is discussed in section B. There are a significant number of additional
securities law issues involved in consummating a pre-packaged plan which are beyond the scope of this article. For example, the prepetition solicitation may subject
proponents to liability under various antifraud provisions of the securities laws. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1989) (governing proxy
solicitations and requiring disclosure of material facts); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Rule 14a-9(a), 17 CFR § 240.14a-9(a) (1987) (precluding false and misleading statements and omissions of material facts in connection with proxy solicitations); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1989) (prohibiting
use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule lOb-5, 12 CFR § 240.10b-5
(1987) (precluding false and misleading statements and omissions of material
facts). See generally, Weingarten, supra note 12, at 161-66; Epling & Thompson, Securities Disclosure in Bankruptcy, 39 Bus. LAw. 855 (May 1984).
69 Pursuant to section 1125(a)(1) of the Code, "adequate information" is defined as:
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quacy of disclosure are reviewed and can be cured or overruled
prior to bankruptcy court approval.
To the contrary, in a pre-packaged chapter 11, both disclosure and solicitation occur prior to filing. Once the chapter 11
case is filed, under section 1126(b), the bankruptcy court is required to make a retroactive finding in respect of the adequacy of
disclosure.7 0
As previously noted, section 1126(b) requires that the solicitation of the pre-petition plan of reorganization comport with the
disclosure requirements of applicable non-bankruptcy law or section 1125(a) of the Code. The section 1125(a) standard for disclosure is available only to a non-public company. For a public
company, "applicable non-bankruptcy law" means that the disclosure statement must comply with the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 7 '
Thus, the disclosure statement must be submitted to the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") for comment and clearance
by the SEC corporate finance and reorganization staff.
At first blush, submission to the SEC may appear burdensome, but because the requirements of the securities laws are
typically more stringent than the scope of information generally
required under section 1125(a)(1), clearance by the SEC of the
information contained in the disclosure statement should materially assist the debtor in satisfying the bankruptcy court that the
information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably
practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and the
condition of the debtor's books and records, that would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interests
of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the
plan....
11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). The drafters of the Code clearly intended to allow the
bankruptcy courts to determine what constitutes adequate information on a caseby-case basis. H.R. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 408 (1977); S.R. No. 95-989;
95 Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1978). It has been held that the determination of what
constitutes adequate information is subjective and largely within the discretion of
the bankruptcy court. Texas Extrusion Corp. v. Lockheed Corp. (In re Texas Extrusion Corp.), 844 F.2d 1142, 1157 (5th Cir. 1988); Nevord-Sanford v. Mabey (In re
A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 1989).
70 The legislative history of section 1126 states that "[tihis [section] permits the
court to ensure that the requirements of section 1125 are not avoided by pre-petition solicitation." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 410 (1977).
71 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1988 & Supp I. 1990). Section 1145(a) of the Code
exempts securities issued under a plan from the registration requirements of the
federal securities laws. In the context of a pre-packaged chapter 11 plan, the section 1145(a) exemption remains viable because new securities will, in fact, be issued
under a plan of reorganization confirmed within a chapter 11 case. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1145(a).
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disclosure statement did indeed provide "adequate information."' 72 Once the disclosure statement has been cleared by the
SEC, the pre-petition solicitation can commence.
C. Rule 3018(b)
Bankruptcy Rule 3018(b) applies to the actual solicitation in
a pre-packaged chapter 11, and it sets forth additional procedural
requirements that must be followed by the debtor. 73 Essentially,
Bankruptcy Rule 3018 permits the proponent of the plan to obtain before the commencement of the case and to file with the
bankruptcy court the acceptance or rejection of (i) the holder of a
claim or interest which is deemed allowed pursuant to section
502 of the Code,'7 (ii) a creditor who is a security holder of record 75 at the date specified in the solicitation and whose claim has
72 Section 1125(d) of the Code specifically excepts postpetition chapter 11 disclosure from the requirements of the federal securities laws, permitting the SEC to
be heard in the bankruptcy court on disclosure, but not to appeal from an adverse
determination. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Section 1125(e) of the Code is a companion
safe harbor provision absolving a proponent of such solicitation from any liability
under federal securities laws. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(e). There is no authority that these
exemptions are available in a prepetition solicitation. For purposes of postpetition
disclosure, a bankruptcy court is under no duty to analogize to the securities laws.
Kirk v. Texaco, 82 Bankr. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). However, in the chapter 11 case of
The Southland Corp., the bankruptcy court requested that the SEC render a report on
the debtor's compliance with the securities laws under section 1126(b).
73 FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(b) provides:
Acceptances or Reections Obtained Before Petition. Acceptances or rejections of a plan may be obtained before the commencement of a case
under the Code and may be filed with the court on behalf of (1) the
holder of a claim or interest which is deemed allowed pursuant to
§ 502 of the Code or allowed by the court; (2) a creditor who is a
security holder of record at the date specified in the solicitation for
the purposes of such solicitation and whose claim has not been disallowed; and (3) an equity security holder of record at the date specified
in the solicitation for the purposes of such solicitation and whose interest has not been disallowed.
A holder of a claim or interest who has accepted or rejected a
plan before the commencement of the case under the Code shall not
be deemed to have accepted or rejected the plan if the court finds
after notice and hearing that the plan was not transmitted to substantially all impaired creditors and impaired equity security holders, that
an unreasonably short time was prescribed for such creditors and equity security holders to accept or reject the plan, or that the solicitation was not in compliance with § 1126(b) of the Code.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(b).
74 Section 502 sets forth the requirements for allowance of claims against the
debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 502.
75 In a recent memorandum opinion, the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Texas held that only the holder of a claim, creditor or the
holder of an interest, may accept or reject a plan. In re Southland Corp., 124 Bankr.
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not been disallowed and (iii) an equity security holder of record
at the date specified in the solicitation and whose interest has not
been disallowed. Significantly, Bankruptcy Rule 3018 further
provides that the bankruptcy court will not approve the acceptance or rejection of the plan by a holder of a claim or interest if,
after notice and hearing, the bankruptcy court finds that the proposed plan had not been transmitted to substantially all impaired
creditors and impaired equity security holders, 76 an unreasonably
short time was prescribed for such creditors and equity security
holders to accept or reject the plan 77 or 78that the solicitation was
not in compliance with section 1126(b).
211, 227 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991). The court further held that if the record holder
of a debt is not the owner of the claim, or a true creditor, he may not vote unless
there is a certification that such record holder is an authorized agent of the creditor. Id. If a record holder represents more than one creditor, there must be compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 2019. Id. Because the court found the reference to
record holders contained in Bankruptcy Rule 3018 to be in conflict with the Code,
which speaks only of holders of claims and interests, the court held that such reference in Bankruptcy Rule 3018 is an attempted substantive change in the statute that
is of no force and effect. Id.
76 Pursuant to section 1124 of the Code, a class of claims or interests is "impaired" under a plan of reorganization unless (a) the plan leaves unaltered the
legal, equitable or contractual rights to which the holder of the claim is entitled, (b)
notwithstanding contractual provisions or applicable law that entitle the holder of a
claim or interest to demand or receive accelerated payment after default, the plan
cures any actual default, reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest and compensates the holder for any actual damages, or (c) the claim or interest is paid in
full, in cash, under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1124.
77 The bankruptcy court in Southland found that an initial solicitation period of 8
business days, even though such time period was subsequently extended, was an
unreasonably short period of time. Southland, 124 Bankr. at 226.
78 Because of the absence of bankruptcy court review of pre-packaged chapter
11 disclosure prior to solicitation, the procedural requirements set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 3018 for a pre-petition solicitation are more detailed than the Code
requirements for a post-petition solicitation. See Advisory Committee Note to
Bankruptcy Rule 3018 ("This provision [Bankruptcy Rule 3018] together with
§ 1126(e) [disqualifying acceptances not procured in good faith] gives the court the
power to nullify abusive solicitation procedures.").
In Southland, the debtor agreed to provide soliciting broker dealers with a fee in
connection with the vote on the plan, and retained a bank or depository agent to
tabulate the vote. Southland, 124 Bankr. at 213. The bankruptcy court stated that
the solicitation fee created a conflict of interest between the broker-dealer and its
customer that could taint the good faith of the solicitation process. Id. Moreover,
the bankruptcy court was concerned that the depository agent was given broad discretion to determine which ballots would be deemed valid. Id. Finally, the bankruptcy court expressed concern about the complexity of the ballot form that was
utilized. Id. See also In re NJB Prime Investors, 3 Bankr. 553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1979)
("In the scheme of a chapter 11, the debtor may solicit acceptances before the court
can pass on the validity of the plan; but the court must examine those acceptances
to make sure that they comply with the Act and are, in fact, volitional expressions of
a creditor's willingness to accept a plan. True, the law is liberal as to the form of an
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Two of the procedural requirements set forth in Bankruptcy
Rule 3018 must be carefully complied with because the bankruptcy court is required to make retroactive findings with regard
to the mechanics of the pre-petition solicitation. First, the debtor
must ensure that substantially all impaired creditors and equity
security holders are solicited. In the case of registered debt or
equity securities, the lists maintained by indenture trustees or
stock transfer agents can be utilized, but some thought must be
given to the solicitation of holders whose securities are held in
street name.79
The language of Bankruptcy Rule 3018(b)(2) and (3) appears to allow the debtor itself to establish appropriate record
dates for purposes of the solicitation. In the case of impaired
trade or ordinary course of business creditors where the debtor
elects to freeze its payables at some time prior to the solicitation,
this class must be carefully identified and solicited.80
Second, the debtor must ultimately show in the bankruptcy
court that creditors and equity security holders were given a reasonable time to accept or reject the plan of reorganization.
While Bankruptcy Rule 3018 does not set forth a time period for
the solicitation, compliance with the twenty-five day notice period required for confirmation of a plan set forth in Bankruptcy
Rule 2002(b)(2) in a normal chapter 11 case should be
sufficient."'
acceptance, requiring only that it be in writing and signed by the creditor or his
agent. But it is necessary that the writing 'clearly identify the plan proposed by the
debtor as the one being accepted. . . .' Where an acceptance was signed before the
chapter 11 petition was filed, it is essential that it clearly appear that the creditor
accepted a settlement offer on the same terms as the arrangement proposed by the
debtor in the chapter 11 case." (quoting 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcY 5.23(4) (14th
ed.)).
79 In Southland, the court held that beneficial owners of securities, that is actual
creditors and holders of equity interests and not record owners, are entitled to vote
under the Code. Southland, 124 Bankr. at 226-27. Therefore, where representatives of beneficial owners vote, there must be disclosure of the beneficial owner
plus a certification that the representative is entitled to vote on its behalf. Id.
80 A debtor with severe financial difficulties may stretch out actual payment of its
ordinary course payables to conserve cash. In contemplation of a chapter 11 filing,
a debtor will often freeze payments on all payables as of a certain date. Such action
may allow a debtor to build a war chest to assist in financing a chapter 11 case. In
the case of a pre-packaged chapter 11, it may be necessary to impair a class of trade
creditors and obtain the acceptance of such class for confirmation of the plan of
reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(10), (b). Therefore, all payments to such
creditors must cease prior to solicitation.
81 Considering the problem with securities being held in street name discussed
above, supra at notes 75 and 79, and that the receipt of the solicitation materials in a
pre-packaged chapter 11 may be the first indication that many creditors and equity
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Southland is the first significant decision interpreting section
1126(b) of the Code, Bankruptcy Rule 3018 and the mechanics of
a prepetition solicitation.8 2 In that case, the debtor originally allowed only eight business days for creditors and holders of interests to vote. The debtor, relying on the language of Bankruptcy
Rule 3018, solicited only record holders of claims and interests.
Thus, solicitation materials were sent only to broker dealers who
held securities in street name. Such broker dealers were also
provided with a solicitation fee. The debtor utilized a single ballot for the numerous classes of debt and equity that was lengthy
and complex. The debtor also retained a bank to tabulate the
votes and the bank was given broad discretion regarding which
votes would be counted as valid. A group of creditors objected
to the mechanics of the solicitation.
The bankruptcy court held that eight business days constituted an unreasonably short solicitation. The bankruptcy court
discussed the mechanics of the debtor's solicitation and made
several observations that should be carefully considered in any
future pre-petition solicitation.
First, the court observed that the broker-dealer solicitation
fee constituted an inherent conflict between the broker-dealer
and its creditor customer. In dicta, the court stated that this fee
arrangement, while common in exchange offers outside of a
bankruptcy context, cast doubt on the good faith of the solicitation. Second, the bank retained to tabulate the vote, which, the
court observed, was not well versed in bankruptcy voting requirements, made value judgments about whether and how certain
ballots would be counted.83 The court stated that, under the circumstances, a true vote was impossible to determine.
The most significant part of the Southland decision, however,
concerned the court's interpretation of Bankruptcy Rule 3018
and the solicitation of record holders. The court stated that section 1126 of the Code, and all subsections thereof, utilizes the
words "holders of claims", "claims", "interests" and "creditors",
and there is no mention of "record holders".8 4
holders have that the debtor is in need of a restructuring. A debtor would be welladvised to consider a somewhat longer solicitation period.
82 Southland, 124 Bankr. at 223-27. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
83 In a typical chapter 11 case, the vote on a plan is generally certified by the
debtor and/or its counsel. However, it is not uncommon for a third party tabulator
to be retained to tally the vote.
84 The court cited U.S. v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235 (1989), for the
proposition that the plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in
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While the court noted the use of record holder in Bankruptcy
Rule 3018, it found that the focus was still on actual creditors and
equity security holders. Accordingly, the court held that references in Bankruptcy Rule 3018 to record holders constituted
substantive changes in the Code that are of no force and effect.8 5
The court ordered a resolicitation and held that, if votes
were cast by broker-dealers or other representatives, (a) there
must be disclosure of the true identity of the holder of the claim
or interest and (b) a certification of authority to vote in a representative capacity. Further, if a representative acts for more than
one creditor or interest holder, the representative must file a
statement under Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) in respect of the facts
regarding its representation of such entities.
D.

The Chapter 11 Case
It is only after receipt of all requisite acceptances that the
chapter 11 case is commenced by the filing of a petition. 6 If all
goes well, the first substantive event should be a combined hearing on the disclosure statement and confirmation of the plan.87
At that hearing, the bankruptcy court is required to find that the
solicitation of acceptances and rejections was in compliance with
section 1126(b) of the Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3018. In order
to make that finding, the bankruptcy court must "qualify" the acceptances upon a showing that substantially all creditors and eqthose cases where a literal application produces a result clearly at odds with the
drafter's intent.
85 In authorizing the United States Supreme Court to prescribe "Rules of Practice and Procedure under Title 11," Congress also provided that "such rules shall
not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1978).
86 11 U.S.C. § 301. Simultaneously with the filing, there are additional administrative requirements that must be completed. Schedules of assets and liabilities,
and a statement of the debtor's financial affairs in conformity with the Bankruptcy
Code, Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms must be completed and ready to file
with the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 521. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007; Official Forms 6 and 8.
A motion and proposed order fixing a bar date for the filing of proofs of claim and
interest must also be prepared. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(3). Finally, a motion
must be prepared requesting immediate authority to send a notice to creditors and
equity security holders fixing a single date for a hearing on (i) approval of the disclosure statement, (ii) acceptance of the plan or reorganization and (iii) confirmation of the plan.
87 In Southland, a group of bondholders who were unhappy with the proposed
terms of the pre-packaged plan sought to form a committee of dissenters to assert
objections to the disclosure statement and plan. Motion and Memorandum of Individual Debentureholders for Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and 1102(a)(2)
Directing Appointment of Additional Creditors' Committee Representative of NonTendering Debentureholders, dated October 29, 1990. This motion was denied in
an unreported decision from the bench on November 9, 1990.
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uity security holders were solicited, 8 that the solicitation period
was reasonable and that disclosure was adequate under section
1126(b). 9 Thereafter, a typical confirmation hearing can proceed with testimony showing that the confirmation requirements
under section 1129(a) of the Code have been met.9 °
88 Prior to the hearing, the debtor should carefully review all filed proofs of
claim and interest and evidence should be presented showing whether substantially
all of the holders of such claims and interests were in fact solicited.
89 Because the bankruptcy court must find under section 1126(b) of the Code
that the pre-petition disclosure was adequate under applicable non-bankruptcy law,
a separate finding that disclosure is adequate under section 1125(a) of the Code is
not technically required. See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1. In practice, many debtors
still request that the bankruptcy court make a finding under section 1125(a). Such
a request was made in the Anglo Energy case and the bankruptcy court made disclosure findings under both section 1126(b) and section 1125(a). Anglo Energy, Case
No. 88B 10360 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
90 Pursuant to section 1129(a) of the Code, a plan may be confirmed by order of
the bankruptcy court if each of the following requirements is met:
- section 1129(a)(1) requires that the plan comply with all applicable provisions of the Code;
- section 1129(a)(2) requires that the plan proponent comply
with all applicable provisions of the Code;
- section 1129(a)(3) requires that the plan be proposed in good
faith and not by any means forbidden by law;
- section 1129(a)(4) requires that all payments of fees to professionals made in connection with the chapter 11 case be disclosed and
approved by the bankruptcy court as reasonable;
- section 1129(a) (5) requires the disclosure of any individual proposed to serve as an officer, director or voting trustee of the debtor
after confirmation of the plan;
- section 1129(a)(6) requires that any regulatory commission
with jurisdiction over the rates of the debtor approve any changes in
rates provided in the plan;
- section 1129(a)(7) requires that, with respect to each class of
impaired claims or interests, the plan is in their best interest in that
the holders of each such claim or interest has either accepted the plan
or will retain or receive under the plan property of a value as of the
effective date of the plan not less than that which such holder would
receive in a liquidation under chapter 7 of the Code;
- section 1129(a)(8) requires that each class of claims and interests either has accepted the plan or is not impaired under the plan;
- section 1 129(a)(9) requires that the holders of certain administrative or priority claims receive cash in the allowed amounts of such
claims on the effective date of the plan or deferred cash payments;
- section 1 129(a)(10) requires that, if a class of claims is impaired
under the plan, at least one class of impaired claims has accepted the
plan (without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider);
- section 1 129(a) (11) requires the court to find that the plan is
feasible in that confirmation is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor;
- section 1129(a)(12) requires that all fees due under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1930 be paid on the effective date of the plan; and
- section 1129(a)(13) requires that a plan provide for the contin-
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SELECTED CASE STUDIES

Numerous recent cases illustrate the use of pre-packaged
chapter 11 plans:
A.

Anglo Energy, Inc.91

The pre-packaged chapter 11 of Anglo Energy, Inc. ("Anglo") is an example of the reorganization of a company with a
relatively simple capital structure. In Anglo, senior secured obligations of approximately $108,000,000 (the result of a prior
chapter 11 plan of reorganization confirmed in 1986) were effectively swapped for new common shares representing slightly less
than 80% of the equity of the reorganized debtor. Unsecured
trade creditors were impaired under the plan, but received 50%
of their claims in cash at consummation of the plan, and 50%
thirty days thereafter. Existing shareholders (and holders of warrants) were substantially diluted.
In the Anglo chapter 11 case, there were no objections raised
regarding the pre-petition solicitation or confirmation. The Anglo chapter 11 was confirmed 45 days from the filing date and
consummated 26 days thereafter.
B.

92

Southland Corporation

The Southland Corporation ("Southland") was the subject
of a 1987 LBO which was financed, in part, by the public sale of
various notes and debentures aggregating approximately $2 billion dollars (the "public debt"). The Southland restructuring began as an exchange offer to holders of the public debt and
preferred stock. In March 1990, Southland agreed to sell a seventy-five percent (75%) ownership stake to Ito-Yakada Co. a
long-time business partner. In conjunction with the sale of stock,
an initial exchange offer was made to holders of the public debt
inJuly 1990, conditioned upon ninety-five percent (95%) acceptued repayment of retiree benefits for the duration of the period that
the debtor has obligated itself to provide such benefits.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a).
To the extent that a class has not accepted the plan during the pre-petition
solicitation, the cramdown provisions set forth in section 1129(b) of the Code are
available for the debtor to utilize to seek confirmation despite the rejection by such
class. The debtor should disclose the possibility of cramdown in its solicitation. If
there is a non-accepting class, the debtor can proceed with the requisite showing
required under section 1129(b).
91 Case No. 88 B 10360 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).
92 Case No. 390-37119-A-1I (Bankr. N.D. Tex.)(Dallas Division).
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ance by holders of each issue of public debt and preferred
stock. 93 The exchange offer did not receive the requisite acceptances. Thus, in October 1990, Southland modified its exchange
offer solely to add a pre-packaged chapter 11 option where it reserved the right to use the acceptances in a subsequent chapter
11 case.
A group of dissident bondholders seeking a sweetened deal
challenged the Southland solicitation. Ultimately, the debtor
amended the plan improving the offer to certain classes of debt,
including the class represented by the dissident bondholders.
The objection was withdrawn and the case was confirmed on February 21, 1991. The case was actually commenced on October
24, 1990.
Despite the litigation surrounding the solicitation, Southland is an example of a pre-packaged chapter 11 of a debtor that
was the subject of an LBO and had a complex capital structure.
The case illustrates that the pre-packaged chapter 11 is wellsuited to the multiple recapitalizations that will be required as a
result of the over-leveraged transactions consummated in the
1980's.
94
C. Republic Health Corp.

Republic Health Corp. ("Republic") was the subject of a
leveraged buyout by REPH Acquisition Company ("REPH") in
1986. Commencing in September 1989, REPH and Republic,
companies with complex capital structures, commenced a major
recapitalization.
Under the recapitalization, shareholders were asked to approve a merger agreement (the "Merger") between Republic and
REPH pursuant to which REPH would be merged into Republic
with Republic being the surviving entity. The effect of the
Merger would be to convert the outstanding preferred and common shares of REPH to Republic common shares, and to cancel
outstanding REPH warrants. As a result, the shareholders of
REPH would be substantially diluted.
The second component of the recapitalization was a series of
exchange offers to holders of public debt securities of both
REPH and Republic (the "Exchange Offers").
The debtors initially sought to consummate the Merger and
93 See Appendix I.
94

Case No. 389-38127-F-1 1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.)(Dallas Division).
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Exchange Offers outside of chapter 11. For the Merger, approval
of 50% of each class or REPH shareholders was required. For
the Exchange Offers, 100% acceptance was required for certain
public debt issues and 90% for other public debt issues. If the
Merger and the Exchange Offers could not be consummated
outside of chapter 11, the debtors proposed to utilize the acceptances
received in the subsequent filing of pre-packaged chapter
11.95
The Exchange Offers and the Merger did not receive the
requisite acceptances to be consummated outside of a chapter 11
case. In December of 1989, Republic filed its pre-packaged chapter 11. The pre-packaged plan was confirmed in four months.
VII.

SUMMARY

As noted above, other than the recent Southland decision,
there is little caselaw construing the provisions of section 1126 of
the Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3018, presumably because prepackaged chapter I1 's were used infrequently until recently. The
use of pre-packaged chapter I1 's will undoubtedly increase as a
result of the Chateaugay case, the repeal of § 1275(a)(4) of the
Internal Revenue Code and the significant savings in time and
money resulting from the use of a pre-packaged plan. As the
number of such cases increase and the experience with pre-packaged plans becomes more widespread, unforeseeable pitfalls to
such use may develop. The difficulties in the mechanics of the
Southland solicitation illustrate that debtor's counsel must utilize
extreme care to assure that disclosure is adequate and that the
procedure of the solicitation cannot be attacked. Nevertheless,
absent reversal of Chateaugay and reinstatement of tax relief such
as existed in the now repealed § 1275(a)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, debt-laden companies have little to lose in trying to
restructure their capital base under a pre-packaged plan, and
much to gain. After all, a full blown bankruptcy will always be an
available last resort.
95 The terms of the Merger and the Exchange Offers in the pre-packaged chapter 1 1 were slightly different from the terms used for the non-bankruptcy recapitalization and are summarized at Appendix II.
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APPENDIX I
THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION EXCHANGE OFFER

Tendering holders of public debt and preferred stock were offered
the following exchange:
For Each $1,000 Principal
Amount or Share, As Applicable,
of:

Holders Will Receive:

131/2% Senior Extendible Reset
Notes due December 15, 1995
and extendible to June 15, 1997
(the "Old Senior Notes")

$475 principal amount of 12%
Senior Notes due December 15,
1996 (the "New Senior Notes"),
86.5 shares of Common Stock of
the Company (the "Common
Stock") and $57 in cash

153/4% Senior Subordinated
Notes due December 15, 1997
(the "Old Senior Subordinated
Notes")

$650 principal amount of 5%
First Priority Senior Subordinated Debentures due December 15,
2003 (the "New First Priority
Debentures") and 40.5 shares of
Common Stock
$555 principal amount of New
First Priority Debentures and 35
shares of Common Stock

161/2% Senior Subordinated Discount Notes due December 15,
1997 (the "Old Senior
Subordinated Discount Notes")
163/4% Subordinated Debentures
due December 15, 2002 (the
"Old Subordinated Debentures")

$500 principal amount of 4.5%
Second Priority Senior
Subordinated debentures (Series
A) due June 15, 2004 (the "New
Second Priority Series A Debentures") and 28 shares of Common Stock

18% Junior Subordinated Discount Debentures due December
15, 2007 (the "Old Junior
Subordinated Debentures")

$257 principal amount of 4%
Second Priority Senior
Subordinated Debentures (Series
B) due June 15, 2004 (the "New
Second Priority Series B Debentures") and 11 shares of Common Stock

15% Cumulative Exchangeable
Preferred Stock, Series One, $25
liquidation preference per share
(the "Old Preferred Stock")

One share of Common Stock
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APPENDIX II
THE REPUBLIC HEALTH EXCHANGE OFFER

For each
$1,000 principal amount
of:

The Exchanging Holder
will receive
from the
Company:

10.5%
Debentures

$808.41 principal amount
of New First
Notes

11.5%

$808.41 principal amount
of New First
Notes

Debentures

15%

$100 in cash

Debentures
New Second
Notes in an
aggregate
principal
amount equal
to the sum of
(i) $550 plus
(ii) an amount
equal to $550
multiplied by
4% per annum calculated from July
1, 1989
through the
closing date
of the Exchange Offer
for the 15%
Debentures

Common
Stock Ownership Under
Non-Bankruptcy Recapitalization:

Common
Stock Ownership Under
Bankruptcy
Recapitalization:

1991]

131/2%

Debentures
due 1999
121/2%

Debentures
due 2004
13%
Debentures

PREPACKAGED BANKRUPTCY PLANS
Warrants to
purchase five
shares of
Common
Stock at
$10.00 per
share
40 shares of
Common
Stock
40 shares of
Common
Stock
40 shares of
Common
Stock

37.08%

37.55%

33.69%

34.14%

17.03%

17.07%
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THE MERGER

For each
share of:

The REPH
Stockholders
will receive
from the
Company:

Common
Stock Ownership Under
Non-Bankruptcy Recapitalization:

Common
Stock Ownership Under
Bankruptcy
Recapitalization:

REPH
Preferred

.31653 shares
of Common
Stock

6.65%

6.13%

REPH
Common

.11215 shares
of Common
Stock

5.55%

5.11%

